Fourth Circuit Narrows NLRA Managerial Exception

Labor law has a funny way of making job titles sound way more dramatic than they are. “Lead.” “Senior.” “Program owner.” “Chief of this very specific thing.” In many workplaces, those titles can come with real responsibilitybut not necessarily the kind of authority that strips a worker of protection under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).

That is exactly why the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Constellis LLC v. NLRB matters. In practical terms, the court reinforced a narrower, fact-driven approach to the NLRA’s managerial employee exception, emphasizing that an employee is not “managerial” simply because they exercise expertise, help write policies, or operate with a lot of discretion. The big question is whether the person actually has authority to formulate and effectuate management policies in a way that aligns them with management rather than rank-and-file employees.

For employers, unions, HR teams, and labor counsel, this case is a reminder that the NLRA analysis is not a title contest. It is an authority-and-function test. And yes, that means your “operations ninja” may still be fully protected by federal labor law.

Why This Case Matters for the NLRA

The NLRA protects most private-sector employees when they engage in protected concerted activitythings like discussing pay, working conditions, safety, scheduling, and organizing with coworkers. The Act also prohibits employers from interfering with those rights and from retaliating against employees for protected activity.

But not everyone is covered. The statute excludes certain categories (like supervisors), and courts have also recognized a managerial employee exceptionan implied exclusion for workers whose responsibilities align them with management policy-making.

That exception has been around for decades, but applying it in real workplaces is messy. Why? Because modern jobs often blend technical expertise, project leadership, and operational discretion. A person can be highly trusted and still not be a “managerial employee” under the NLRA.

Quick NLRA Framework (Without the Law School Cold Call)

At a high level:

• Section 7 protects employee rights to organize and act together regarding workplace issues.
• Section 8 makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with those rights or retaliate against employees for protected activity.
• Section 2 defines who counts as an “employee,” and litigation often turns on coverage questions.

So when an employer argues that someone is “managerial,” the employer is essentially saying: this person is outside the NLRA’s coverage, so the Act’s protections do not apply to them in the first place.

The Legal Backdrop: Bell Aerospace, Yeshiva, and Narrow Construction

Bell Aerospace Put the Managerial Exception on the Map

In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. (1974), the Supreme Court confirmed that employees properly classified as “managerial” are excluded from NLRA protection, even though the Act does not expressly list “managerial employees” the way it does supervisors. That case became a cornerstone for managerial-status disputes.

But Bell Aerospace did not create a magic wand for employers. It did not say “important employee = managerial employee.” It required a legal classification based on what the worker actually does.

Yeshiva Shaped the University-Faculty Context

Then came NLRB v. Yeshiva University (1980), where the Supreme Court held that certain full-time private university faculty were managerial because they effectively controlled central academic and personnel policies in a “mature” university governance system. Yeshiva is often cited whenever employers argue that professional employees are really managers.

But here’s the trap: people sometimes read Yeshiva too broadly. The decision turned on a detailed record showing faculty authority over core institutional policynot just input, expertise, or committee participation.

Courts Still Read NLRA Exclusions Carefully

Another important theme comes from later decisions, including Holly Farms, where the Supreme Court emphasized that exclusions from NLRA coverage should not be stretched so broadly that workers lose protections Congress meant them to have. That interpretive approach matters a lot in close cases.

Translation: when the record is fuzzy, courts and the Board are not supposed to casually expand exclusions. If an employer wants the managerial exception, it needs factsnot vibes.

The Fourth Circuit Case: What Happened in Constellis LLC v. NLRB?

The Dispute in Plain English

The case involved Constellis (including the ACADEMI Training Center), where an employee, Robert Macri, engaged in protected activity. The NLRB found multiple unfair labor practice violations and rejected the employer’s claim that Macri was a managerial employee outside NLRA coverage.

The employer petitioned for review, and the NLRB sought enforcement of its order. The Fourth Circuit denied the employer’s petition and granted enforcement, agreeing that substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that Macri was not a managerial employee.

What the NLRB Found

According to the Board’s summary of the case, the NLRB found violations involving threats/coercive statements, interrogation, implied surveillance, changes to work assignments and overtime, and Macri’s discharge tied to union and protected concerted activities. Those are serious findings, and they depend heavily on whether the employee is actually covered by the Act.

That is why the managerial-status argument was such a central issue. If Macri were truly managerial, many NLRA protections at issue would not apply to him. If he was covered, the employer faced enforcement of the Board’s order. The classification question was not academicit was the hinge.

Why the Fourth Circuit Said “Not Managerial”

The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning is what makes this decision so useful for practitioners. The court focused on substance over title and described the managerial exception as one to be construed narrowly. The court also highlighted that the Board had reasonably distinguished between significant discretion in performing one’s role and actual authority to set company policy.

Macri apparently had meaningful responsibilities: he oversaw training-related functions, developed materials/policies in a training context, and exercised professional judgment. But the record did not show that he had unilateral authority to determine company direction, pricing, funding, contract negotiation outcomes, or broader management policy in the sense required for the exception.

In other words, he may have been a key operator. He was not management for NLRA coverage purposes.

How the Fourth Circuit “Narrows” the Managerial Exception (and What That Really Means)

To be clear, the Fourth Circuit did not abolish the managerial exception. It did something more practicaland arguably more important: it reinforced a narrower application tied to actual policy-making authority.

1) Job Titles and Trust Are Not Enough

Lots of employees are trusted. Lots have discretion. Lots write procedures. Lots train others. Lots speak to clients. None of that automatically makes them managerial under the NLRA.

The Fourth Circuit’s approach is a useful warning against “title inflation” in labor-law analysis. Calling someone a manager in payroll software or org charts is not the same as proving they formulate and effectuate management policy.

2) Expertise Is Not the Same as Management Alignment

A professional can have deep subject-matter expertise and even shape how work gets done without being aligned with management in the legal sense. That distinction matters in industries with specialized operationsdefense contracting, healthcare, higher education, engineering, tech, and logistics.

The court’s reasoning helps preserve NLRA protection for highly skilled workers who make operational recommendations but do not truly control employer policy.

3) “Policy” Means More Than Drafting or Recommending

One of the most common employer arguments in these disputes is: “But they wrote the policy!” Courts and the Board usually ask a follow-up question: “Surebut who actually approved it, controlled it, funded it, negotiated it, and could change it?”

The Fourth Circuit’s decision reinforces that recommending, drafting, or implementing in a limited domain is not the same as formulating and effectuating management policy at the employer level.

4) Narrow Construction Still Matters in Close Cases

This case also fits a broader pattern in NLRA coverage jurisprudence: exclusions are not supposed to swallow the rule. The Act is protective legislation. Courts can and do recognize exceptions, but they often require a clear record before removing workers from coverage.

For employers, that means classification arguments need careful evidence. For employees and unions, it means there is room to challenge overbroad “managerial” labels.

Practical Takeaways for Employers, HR, and Labor Counsel

Audit Your “Managerial” Labels Before a Dispute Starts

If a company is relying on managerial status in organizing campaigns or unfair labor practice litigation, it should conduct a real audit of dutiesnot just review titles. Ask:

• Does the employee make final policy decisions, or merely recommend?
• Can the employee commit the company on major strategic or labor-related issues?
• Is the authority employer-wide, departmental, or task-specific?
• Who has final approval authority in practice?
• What does the record (emails, approvals, org charts, budgets) actually show?

Train Front-Line Leaders on Protected Concerted Activity

Even when there is a real dispute about coverage, employers should not assume an employee is outside the Act and then act aggressively. Threats, interrogation, surveillance impressions, or sudden assignment/overtime changes can create major litigation risk if the classification call goes the other way.

That is exactly how a “we thought he was management” theory can turn into an enforceable NLRB order.

Build Evidence, Not Assumptions

In litigation, courts look for concrete facts. If an employer claims someone sets policy, it should be able to identify actual examples of final decision-making authoritynot just “everyone knew he was important.” Importance is not the test. Authority is.

Practical Takeaways for Employees and Unions

Employees with advanced responsibilities often hear some version of: “You’re management, so labor law doesn’t apply to you.” Sometimes that is true. Sometimes it is absolutely not.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision is a useful reminder that workers can have leadership functions and still be NLRA-protected if they do not actually formulate and effectuate employer policy. Union organizers and employee advocates should evaluate the real authority structure, including approval chains, budgets, and who has the last word.

In short: if your badge says “lead” but every major decision still requires three approvals and a spreadsheet from Finance, the NLRA coverage question may not be as simple as your employer says.

Specific Examples: When Someone May (or May Not) Be Managerial

Example 1: Training Lead at a Contractor

A training lead designs lesson plans, recommends equipment, and runs the day-to-day schedule. But pricing, staffing levels, contract terms, and corporate policy all require executive approval. That employee may have broad discretion, yet still be non-managerial under the NLRA.

Example 2: Clinical Program Director in Healthcare

A director develops protocols and supervises implementation but cannot set compensation policy, budget priorities, or labor strategy. Depending on the facts, this person may be a supervisor (a separate statutory issue) or may remain an employee for NLRA purposesbut “managerial” is not automatic.

Example 3: University Faculty Committee Member

A faculty member serves on committees and votes on curriculum recommendations, but the administration routinely reviews, modifies, or rejects proposals. Under Yeshiva and later cases, the analysis turns on effective controlnot committee membership alone.

Example 4: Procurement Executive With Final Authority

A procurement executive can bind the company on major purchasing strategy, set sourcing policy, and direct budget allocations with minimal review. That begins to look much more like true managerial status under the case law.

Extended Section: Real-World Experiences and Practice-Based Lessons (Approx. )

In real workplaces, disputes about the NLRA managerial exception rarely begin with a grand constitutional debate. They usually start with a conversation that sounds ordinary: “I thought you were part of management.” Then someone asks, “Based on what?” and the room gets very quiet.

One common experience reported by labor and employment lawyers is that companies often confuse autonomy with managerial status. A highly capable employee may run a project independently, train junior staff, and solve problems without constant oversight. From an operations perspective, that person feels “managerial.” But once counsel maps the approval chain, the picture changes: budgets require signoff, staffing decisions require HR approval, pricing decisions belong to finance or executives, and policy changes are reviewed two or three levels up. The employee is influential, yesbut not necessarily a policy-maker under the NLRA.

Another recurring experience comes from HR teams during organizing campaigns. Employers sometimes rely on informal labels such as “team lead,” “program manager,” or “site coordinator” to decide who is in or out of a bargaining unit. That can work administrativelyuntil it reaches the NLRB. At that point, the analysis becomes fact-intensive. Investigators and litigators start asking for examples: Who approves overtime? Who disciplines? Who sets rates? Who can commit company resources? Who writes policy, and who can reject it? Many employers discover that their internal labels were designed for workflow, not legal classification.

Employee-side advocates describe the flip side: workers with serious responsibility can hesitate to speak up about conditions because they assume they are “too senior” for labor-law protections. In practice, some of these workers remain fully protected because their role is operational, technical, or advisorynot managerial in the legal sense. The Fourth Circuit’s approach is meaningful in that context because it reinforces a common-sense distinction: being trusted to do difficult work is not the same as being entrusted with the employer’s policy-making authority.

There is also a litigation lesson here. The strongest cases usually do not hinge on abstract job descriptions. They hinge on day-to-day evidence. Emails showing who requested approval. Budget documents showing decision rights. Contract records showing who negotiated terms. Meeting notes showing who recommended a change versus who made the decision. The Fourth Circuit’s decision is a reminder that courts care about how authority works in reality, not just how it sounds in a title or résumé bullet point.

Finally, a practical culture lesson: clear role design helps everyone. When companies define decision rights carefully, they reduce legal risk, internal confusion, and the temptation to overstate or understate someone’s authority. That is good management, good compliance, and frankly, good manners. Nobody enjoys finding out they are “management” only when it is time to deny them legal protectionsand “not management” only when it is time to hand them more work.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Constellis LLC v. NLRB is an important reminder that the NLRA managerial exception is not a catch-all for experienced, trusted, or high-performing employees. The court reinforced a narrower, evidence-based analysis focused on actual policy-making authority and management alignment.

For employers, the message is simple: classify carefully and document real authority. For employees and unions, the message is just as important: do not assume a leadership title automatically removes NLRA protection. In labor law, the label on the door matters far less than who actually holds the keys.